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1Barriers to Eﬃciency and the Privatization of Township-Village
Enterprises
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1978, China opened its borders to the West and initiated several social and economic
reforms. Since that time, the world has watched China rapidly evolve into an economic
power, with an annual growth rate in per capita gross domestic product of over 8 percent.
Rural reforms have had the longest history and are considered among the most successful
of the reforms implemented by the Chinese Central Government: e.g., the rural household
contract responsibility system and the development of rural enterprises.
As noted by Liu (2000) much of the growth has been attributed to the emergence of
China’s non-state sector. In 1978, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) accounted for 78% of
national industrial output; by 1993 that percentage had shrunk to 43%, with non-state
enterprises providing 57% of total production. During this period, a particularly dynamic
segment of the non-state sector had been the rural enterprise sector, which grew from provid-
ing 9% of national industrial output in 1978 to providing 36% in 1993 (Che and Qian, 1998).
Rural enterprises consist of two ownership types: Township-Village Enterprises (TVEs) and
private enterprises. TVEs are not private enterprises, nor state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Instead, they are rural community (township or village) enterprises that, in principle, are
owned by local residents, but in fact controlled by community governments (Chang and
Wang, 1994; Che and Qian, 1998).
Unlike the large-scale privatization of SOEs in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, China relied heavily on TVEs to transition from a planned economy to a market
oriented economy. Between 1979 and 1993, the TVEs share of national industrial output
expanded from 9 percent to 27 percent, while the share of rural private enterprises increased
1from 0 to 9 percent (China Statistical Yearbook, 1994). By 1993, TVEs produced over 40%
of China’s exports and employed more than 40% of the nation’s industrial workers (Bowles
and Dong, 1997). After 1993, however, the economic performance of TVEs in terms of
proﬁt per capita began a downward spiral, and eventually China witnessed the large-scale
privatization of TVEs. According to a recent survey of over 600 ﬁrms in Eastern China,
65 percent of these ﬁrms were privatized between 1993 and 2000 (Brandt, Li and Roberts,
2000).
This paper uses Nerlovian type measures to compare the economic performance of private
enterprises and Township-Village enterprises during the pre-1994 and post-1994 years, and
introduces decomposition measures to help explain their relative performances.
1.1 TVEs and Economic Reforms
We believe an understanding of the decline in TVE economic performance is beneﬁtted by
examining the relationship between TVEs and local governments. From both a legal and
practical point of view, Che and Qian (1998, page 7) characterize TVE governance as having
three properties:
(i) All community enterprises within one community are owned collectively by the
residents of that community; (ii) The decisions of managers of these enterprises
are restricted mostly to daily operations; and (iii) The community government
exercises strategic control rights over these enterprises on behalf of the community
residents.
Since the community government plays a critical role in TVE governance, we begin our
study of TVE performance with a discussion of the goals of a typical community (village or
township) government. Jin and Qian (1998) claim the major objectives of the community
government include: (i) increasing the government’s revenue, (ii) creating more non-farm
2employment, and (iii) increasing rural income. In addition, Whiting (1996) notes the total
gross output of a community serves as a major indicator of the local government’s political
performance. The importance of total gross output is suggested by the observation that
local leaders index TVE manager compensation to output and proﬁts (Whiting, 1996).
Qian (1999) divides the period 1978 — 1999 into two stages. The ﬁrst stage, 1978 —
1993, was dominated by incentive schemes called “particularistic contracting.”1 With such
schemes the incentives of economic agents were improved, while simultaneously protecting
the interests of stakeholders. Through experiments and institutional innovations, a variety
of transitional institutions emerged, with many of them taking unconventional forms. Qian
observed that although many of the institutional arrangements were “second-best, they were
quite eﬀective in providing the right economic incentives.”
During the ﬁrst stage, both state and market institutions were imperfect, and the exist-
ing institutions oﬀered the TVEs and private enterprises both advantages and disadvantages.
First, with community government assistance, TVEs were thought to have better access to
bank loans (Wong, 1988, 1991). During this period, China’s banking systems essentially func-
tioned as government cashiers, and operated on political rather than commercial principles.
Also, state banks were believed to be more willing to lend to TVEs because of “ideological
discrimination” against private enterprises (Jin and Qian, 1998). Second, China’s economy
was characterized by declining, but still functioning central government planning institutions
and emerging, but weak market institutions (Nee, 1992). By using the community govern-
ment’s political power and their own collective identity, TVEs were believed to have easier
access to SOE’s technologies and have better access to inputs that were in short supply
1Particularistic contracting were contracts between the government and subordinate units. Examples
include: agricultural contracting between the government and farm households; ﬁscal contracting between
the central and local governments; and industrial proﬁt contracting between the government and state
enterprises (Qian, 1999).
3(Chang and Wang, 1994; Jin and Qian, 1998). On the other hand, private property rights
tended to give private enterprise owners and managers more of an incentive to improve tech-
nical eﬃciency and seek ever more eﬃcient ways to secure scarce inputs. Also, in order to
achieve their community objectives, local governments often induced TVEs to adopt output
targets or labor hiring goals that pushed TVEs away from proﬁt-maximizing or technically
eﬃcient production practices.
The above observations suggest at least three ways in which the relationship between
local governments and TVEs might yield the TVE an economic advantage or disadvantage
over private enterprises: credit access, technology adoption and input allocation, and out-
put/labor distortions. Accordingly, between 1979 — 1993, even if private enterprises adopted
superior technologies, the overall eﬃciency of TVEs could be at least as good as that of
private enterprises due to the possible institutional advantages of easier access to capital
and input supplies.
The second period began in 1994, and continues through 2002. Qian (1999) notes:
By the end of 1993, living standards had signiﬁcantly improved on a widespread
basis, the state sector was no longer the dominant part of the economy, and
most old revolutionaries were gone from the political scene. All of these changes
facilitated a strategic shift in the oﬃcial ideology to completely abandon central
planning and embrace a market system with private ownership. Since 1994,
particularistic contracting is being replaced by universalistic rules2 and market-
supporting institutions based on the rule of law and incorporation of international
best practices being established.
Hence, in addition to governmental and market institutions having become more evolved
and sophisticated, TVEs started to lose the relative advantages associated with the previous
2Universalistic rules refer to uniform rules like tax reform and ownership reform that apply to all enter-
prises regardless of ownership structure.
4institutional environment. More speciﬁcally, beginning in the mid-1990s, banking reforms
were initiated that provided banks incentives to allocate scarce ﬁnancial resources to the
most productive uses: in essence, the reforms made banks independent, proﬁt-driven units.
The impetus for such a move was likely engendered by the TVEs’ increased debt levels and
poor debt servicing behavior. Local governments began regarding TVEs with high levels of
debt as burdensome, and began to see the problem with not using market forces to discipline
TVE performance (Smyth, Wang, Kiang, 2001).
Another institutional detail of note relates to tax and ﬁscal reforms. With the local
government objectives noted above (labor and output goals, tax revenues), during the 1980s
TVEs were easier to tax and control than private enterprises, and hence, were the governance
structure of choice for the local governments. However, in 1994 China introduced major tax
and ﬁscal reforms. These reforms were more closely aligned with international practices and
strengthened the tax collection power of local governments (Qian, 1999). The reforms also
gave local governments more autonomy, but at the expense of increased ﬁscal responsibility
— as central government transfers to locals began to fall. The cut-back in central government
transfers forced the locals to become more self-suﬃcient, and the primary source of local
government funding became the tax revenues raised from TVEs and private enterprises. As
noted above, TVE revenues began to fall relative to private enterprises, and TVEs were much
worse at repaying debts than private enterprises. The combination of falling TVE proﬁts/tax
revenues and poor TVE debt servicing led to a shift in bank and local government lending
preferences, with and private enterprises becoming the preferable institution (Smyth, Wang
and Kiang, 2001; Naughton, 1994).
Along with the improvement of governmental and market institutions, TVEs also lost
their relative advantage over private enterprises in getting scarce inputs, while retaining the
burden of meeting labor hiring and output targets.
5The above observations suggest that institutional factors could have inﬂuenced the rel-
ative economic performance of TVEs and private enterprises, and hence oﬀer explanations
for why private enterprises eventually emerged as the dominant institution for allocating re-
sources in post-1994 China. Qian (1999) and others suggest pre- and post-1994 institutions
might have inﬂuenced TVE and private enterprise: access to credit, technology adoption,
input allocation eﬃciencies, and forced ineﬃcient output/labor decisions. In what follows we
outline a simple procedure for uncovering evidence of relative advantages and disadvantages
oﬀered TVEs and private enterprises in the ﬁrst- and second-stages of China’s economic
reform periods. Speciﬁcally, we deﬁne proﬁt and revenue based measures of overall tech-
nical eﬃciency, and decompose the measures into components that highlight the existence
of credit constraints, output target constraints, labor hiring constraints, and evidence of
allocative ineﬃciencies.
2S i m p l e M o d e l
Before developing a formal model, we feel it is instructive to discuss brieﬂy the structure of a
typical rural community in China. The economic agents in rural China can be conveniently
divided into four major groups: TVEs, private enterprises (PEs), farmers, and local govern-
ments (LGs). In what follows we assume TVEs and PEs both produce the same composite
good using labor, physical capital, and intermediate inputs. Furthermore, we assume TVEs
and PEs have the same technology, and assume that physical capital is a ﬁxed input..
The rural economy in question consists of four representative agents: a single representa-
tive farmer, a TVE, a PE, and a LG. We assume the central government chooses the set of
institutional reforms, and the institutional reforms inﬂuence the banks’ (LG) loan decisions
and the LG’s preferences. For example, banking reforms that transform government banks
into commercial banks are typically accompanied by a shift in the lending preferences of the
6LG and bank: from favoring SOEs and TVEs, to favoring PEs.
Given the institutional environment, the local governments choose eﬀort levels to allocate
in helping the TVE and PE get loans, and chooses output targets and minimum employment
levels. Then, given the credit, output-target, and minimum employment levels, TVEs and
PEs choose their constrained proﬁt maximizing output, labor, and material input decisions.
Let Ej(I) represent the loan secured by the LG for the type-j enterprise given institutional
environment I.H e r ej =1 , 2 indexes enterprise type with 1 representing the TVE, and 2
representing the PE.
2.1 TVE and PE Preferences
Let f(l,m,K) represent TVE and PE’s output technology, where l is labor input, m is
material input, and K is physical/ﬁxed capital. Without any local government interfer-
ence and perfect capital markets, the TVE and PE are assumed to choose labor and vari-
able/intermediate inputs to maximize proﬁt subject to the technology f (·). Let
π
∗ =m a x
lj,mj,Yj
{pYj − wlj − rmj : Yj ≤ f(lj,m j,K j)}, (1)
j =1 ,2. Here Yj represents the output level produced by enterprise-j, lj and mj represents
the respective labor and material input demanded by that enterprise, and Kj represents
the enterprise’s endowment of physical capital. The parameter p is the price of output, w
is the wage rate, and r is the price of material inputs. Solving the maximization problem









With LG interference, the PE or TVE might be induced to choose input and output







. Also, poorly functioning
credit markets could lead to credit allocations that constrain proﬁt opportunities. Under
expenditure, output-target, and minimum-labor constraints, the ﬁrms’ constrained proﬁt
7maximization program is given by:
πj
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where ¯ Yj is the output target and ¯ lj is the minimum labor employment goal, j =1 ,2.
2.2 Local Government Preferences
Those familiar with the structure of Chinese townships and villages know that local govern-
m e n t sw e r ev e r ym u c hi n v o l v e di nt h ea ﬀairs of TVEs and exercised much control over them
(Chang and Wang, 1994; Naughton, 1994; Bowles and Dong, 1999). Ho (1994) suggests that
during the 1980s, the relationship between LGs and TVEs were quite similar to that between
SOEs and the central or provincial government during the pre-reform days. As discussed
in section 2, local governments were concerned with increasing its own revenue, increasing
rural income, creating non-farm employment, and increasing output productivity (Whiting,
1996; Jin and Qian, 1998).
Local government revenues R come from two major sources: (i) taxes on TVE and
PE output and/or proﬁt, and (ii) ﬁxed administrative fees imposed on TVEs and PEs, and
(typically ﬁxed) fees collected from agricultural production. Since revenues of the second type
are essentially lump-sum, we assume R is a function of π1 and π2.N o n - f a r me m p l o y m e n t ,
denoted L = l1 + l2, is the sum of labor hired by the two ﬁrms. Similarly total output,
denoted Y = Y1 + Y2, is the sum of output produced by both ﬁrms. Farmer income comes
from two sources: revenue from the agricultural production and revenue from the non-farm
employment. In our analysis, we assume the LG assigns little value to the agricultural
income component of farmer income. The LG is interested in the level of non-farm income,
and proxy non-farm income by the units of labor employed by the TVE and PE. Hence,
according to the above discussion, it is reasonable to represent the LG’s preference by the
8function V (π1,π2,Y,L). We assume V is nondecreasing and strictly concave in each of its
arguments.
Usually the LG signs a managerial contract with the TVE manager that ties manager
compensation to output and proﬁt levels (Whiting, 1996), suggesting the LG likely inﬂuences
TVE production choices. Also, a survey conducted by Raiser (1997) suggests LGs induced
over 16 per cent of the TVEs to meet minimum labor hiring goals. In what follows we assume
the LG has some but diﬀerent inﬂuence over the output choice or hiring decisions of the PE
and TVE. Also, we assume the local government exerts some but diﬀerent eﬀort in securing




∗,I)= m a x
e1,e2,l1,l2,Y1,Y2
{V [π1 (E1 (I),Y 1,l 1),π2(E2 (I),Y 2,l 2),l 1 + l2,Y 1 + Y2] (3)
−C
1 (E1 (I),Y 1 − Y
∗
1 ,l 1 − l
∗
1) − C
2 (E2 (I),Y 2 − Y
∗
2 ,l 2 − l
∗
2)
subject to Y1 − Y
∗
1 ≥ 0,l 1 − l
∗
1 ≥ 0,Y 2 − Y
∗
2 ≥ 0,l 2 − l
∗
2 ≥ 0}.
Here, Cj (Ej,Y j − Y ∗,l j − l∗) is the eﬀort cost to the LG of raising Ej in loans for ﬁrm j,
while inducing the ﬁrm to produce Yj units of output and hire lj employees. We assume Cj
is non-decreasing and convex in each of its arguments, and for all (e,l,Y ),C 1 (E,l,Y) <
C2 (E,l,Y) and C1
i (E,l,Y) <C 2
i (E,l,Y),i=2 ,3.T h ea s s u m p t i o n so nC1 and C2 imply
that compared with TVEs, inducing PEs to choose output targets or minimum employment
levels is more diﬃcult/costly for the LG.
The solution to (3), denoted
¡ ¯ E1,¯ l1, ¯ Y1, ¯ E2,¯ l2, ¯ Y2
¢
, might involve output-targets and min-
imum employment goals that are inconsistent with proﬁt maximization. Also, depending on
the institutional regime I,LG eﬀorts might result in loan amounts where ¯ E1 6= E2. The prior
discussion would suggest that before 1994 ¯ E1 might be larger than ¯ E2, but post-1994 this
might not be the case.
Since no well-deﬁned theoretical framework is used to specify the structural and be-
9havioral models of the LG in the transition economy, we will attempt to identify the LG
inﬂuence via the TVE’s and PE’s observed production behavior. In the empirical section we
conduct an exercise that assumes the observed employment and output levels of TVEs and
PEs are levels induced by LGs. Likewise, the observed expenditure constraint is assumed to
be consistent with LG eﬀorts and institutional factors.
3 Methodology
To investigate how these factors such as access to credit, technology adoption, input al-
location eﬃciencies, and forced ineﬃcient output/labor decisions inﬂuence TVEs and PEs
proﬁt-maximizing behavior, we need an empirical method which could include all these fac-
tors into the proﬁt maximization model.
Following the work by Shepard on indirect production theory, Chambers (1982) developed
an analytical framework to use in analyzing optimization problems in the face of expendi-
ture constraints. Lee and Chambers (1986) developed a theory of short-run expenditure
constrained proﬁt maximization and econometrically tested it using US agricultural data.
Later, Fare, Grosskopf and Lee (1990), or FGL, developed a nonparametric alternative to
the Lee and Chambers model for testing expenditure constraints. They applied this model
to a sample of California rice farms. Arnade and Gopinath (2000), or AG, extended the FGL
approach to test for the presence of expenditure constraints and output-target constraints as
sources of ineﬃciency, and examined economic performance in 73 Russian crop production
regions.
As outlined in FGL and AG, this model consists of a series of linear programming prob-
lems. Similar to the nonparametric eﬃciency measures to which they are related, this linear
programming approach produce individual measures of performance too and therefore al-
lows us to identify whether an individual enterprise faces expenditure constraints, revenue
10(output) constraints , or employment constraints and the associated loss in proﬁts resulting
from respective constraints. This method also provides us a measure of proﬁts lost to the
other sources excluding expenditure, revenue (output) and employment constraints.
















+ .T h ek observations maybe for
the same ﬁrm over time or many ﬁrms at one point of time. Following Fare et al. (1985)





















where zk is the “intensity variable” for activity k, and z =
¡
z1,...,zk,...,zK¢
.T h eﬁrst two
constraints in (4) ensure that all input/output combinations in T are technically feasible,
while the last constraint admits variable returns to scale. The three constraints in (4) serve
to form convex combinations of the observed input and output data.
To incorporate the expenditure constraint, we need to partition the inputs. Suppose in-
puts can be partitioned into variable inputs xv and ﬁxed inputs xf. For each input vector k =





















.D e n o t e
output prices by P =( p1,...,pM) ∈ RM
+ and variable input prices by Wv =( wv1,...,wvi,...wvI).
All enterprises are assumed to take the same input and output prices for each input and out-
put, hence the superscript k is dropped from all price vectors.
To introduce expenditure, revenue (output), and employment constraints into model, let
the maximum allowable expenditure be denoted E, minimum revenue be denoted Rc, and
minimum employment be denoted N.Following AG, the expenditure constraint for enterprise
k can be represented by:
wv1x
k




11the revenue constraint for enterprise k can be represented by:
p1y
k





while the employment constraint for enterprise k can be represented by:
xv1 ≥ N
k (7)
w h e r ew el e ti n p u txv1 denote labor.
To get the loss in proﬁts from the expenditure, revenue (output), and employment con-
straints, we calculate proﬁts with the constraints (5) — (7). The superscript k will be dropped
because the variable inputs xv and the outputs y are choice variables. In practice, Ek, Rk
c,









m is used as a proxy for
Rk
c and xk
v1 is used as a proxy for Nk.
Given output and input prices, the ﬁxed factor endowment xk
f, and technology (4), the
unrestricted short-run proﬁt maximization problem for the kth enterprise can be calculated
as the solution to the following linear programming problem:
































k =1 ,z ∈ R
K
+
where the four constraints in (LP.1) represent the technology with I variable inputs, N − I
ﬁxed inputs and M outputs. The expenditure, revenue, and employment constraints are
represented by expressions (5) — (7) respectively.





to (8), i.e., observation k’s solution to the proﬁt maximization problem with no revenue,





represents the solution to










represents (8) along with the revenue, expenditure, and employment
constraints (6) — (7). Finally, denote the actual observed proﬁts for observation k as πak.





By deﬁnition, πak is always less than or equal to πuk. Therefore TEk will be less than or
equal to one, with TEk =1only if the enterprise k is overall eﬃcient. We note, without
proof, that the measures πuk,πrk,πek, and πnk are nested relationships, and hence, allow









, and employment eﬃciency
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The actual eﬃciency could be further decomposed into technical eﬃciency and allocative
eﬃciency.
3.1 Data and Empirical Results
The project requires data on inputs, outputs, variable input prices, output prices, tax pay-
ment, expenditure and revenue for TVEs and private enterprises. Since we treat TVEs and
13private enterprises in each province as a representative enterprise, we will use panel data
of the above variables for the 30 provinces in China, and the data covers the years 1986
through 1999. We have ﬁnished collecting all the data and currently we are running the
Gams programs. The empirical results will be reported soon.
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